That its first edition6 was beautiful and brilliant probably the most important and influential casebook ever written. That the first edition was nevertheless deeply problematic in its vision of federalism, separation of powers, and "cases and controversies." That its newly released third edition is better in many respectsmore aware (though not univocally and uncritically supportive) of a resurgent vision of federal courts as irreplaceable guardians of federal constitutional rights, and active enforcers of federal constitutional remedies, against both state and federal governments. That, in keeping with the casebook's underlying vision of legal doctrine, The Federal Courts and the Federal System is itself in the process of working its grand themes pure. That there thus remains modest room for improvement, and good reason to hope that future editions of the casebook will occupy at least part of that room.
ered."14 As important as the book is bibliographically, it is probably even more significant methodologically in defining what has come to be one of the most important schools of legal thought in late twentiethcentury America, typically described as "the legal process school." Although the jurisprudential richness of this school resists a simple one-line encapsulation and can best be appreciated by immersion in the book itself, a rough-and-ready description of the school might read something like this. The legal process school focuses primary attention on who is, or ought, to make a given legal decision, and how that decision is, or ought, to be made. Is, or ought, a particular legal question to be resolved by the federal or the state government? By courts, legislatures, or executive agencies? If by courts, at the trial level or by appellate tribunals? If at trial, by judges or juries? Subject to what standard of appellate review? And so on. The question what is or ought to be the substantive law governing citizen behavior in a given area is no longer the sole, or even the dominant, object of legal analysis. Rather, legal process analysis illuminates how substantive norms governing primary conduct shape, and are in turn shaped by, organizational structure and procedural rules.
The legal process methodology dovetails nicely with the scope of federal jurisdiction as a discrete field of study. Indeed, the methodology seems to have helped set the boundaries of the field as defined by Hart and Wechslera fact of which the original editors were acutely self-conscious:
The book deals mainly with these problems of federal-state relationships but it also has two secondary themes. In varying contexts we pose the issue of what courts are good forand are not good for seeking thus to open up the whole range of questions as to the appropriate relationship between the federal courts and other organs of federal and state government. We also pose throughout problems of the organization and management of the federal courts . . (ist ed. p. xii).
Although the casebook stands as a monumental landmark in federal jurisdiction and legal process, it does not stand alone: the general issues it posed were at the forefront of legal scholarship in the early I950's. Indeed, in retrospect, the years I953 and I954 appear asthe metaphor is hard to resist -"the golden age" of federal jurisdiction and legal process scholarship. Consider, for example, the arresting number of now-classic articles and significant student Notes in this genre published in those two years by only two law reviews, representing Professor Hart's and Professor Wechsler's respective schools: [Vol. 102:688 norms of behavior (whether derived from the Constitution, statutes, or case law) often required that judges make controversial policy choices, could not metanorms of jurisdiction and procedure transcend many immediate substantive controversies? Put another way, even if people violently disagreed about what the law in a given area was or ought to be, might they nevertheless agree that the legal decision in that area ought to be made by a given legal institution (for example, a federal court) acting under certain specified rules of operation (for example, rules of selection, jurisdiction, procedure, and decision)? If the quest for a "brooding omnipresence" of substantive norms was necessarily misguided, might not a search for a "natural," or at least widely acceptable, law of second-order rules of procedure and jurisdiction yield fruit?30
On a more political and less abstract level, legal realism fueled growing political opposition in the early twentieth century to federal court decisions interpreting the Constitution, statutes, and the common law in a fashion that generally favored business interests. If, as the realists insisted, such decisions often turned on controversial policy choices, by what right did unelected federal judges ever displace the policy decisions of Congress or of state judges and legislators? Once again, the legal process school can be seen as a response to the realists. By paying strict attention to second-order rules allocating power between federal courts and other institutions, the legal process theorists sought to specify with precision the boundaries and purposes of federal judicial power. Once these boundaries and purposes were specified, federal judicial decisionmaking could be both legitimated and restrained.
It is undoubtedly simplistic, but nevertheless convenient and illuminating, to assign the legal process school a precise birthdate: April 25, I938. On that day, the Supreme Court decided a case that, more than any other, appears to have shaped the agenda and analysis of the legal process school over the next sixteen years; a case that, even in the third edition of Hart & Wechsler, remains the most cited (p. lx); a case that John Hart Ely has described as having "mythic" owed to a pedestrian on its right-of-way along and near the rails. But on certiorari, the Supreme Court recast the case. The real issue, according to the Court's legal process reconceptualization, was not one of substantive tort law, but one of the appropriate role of federal courts in relation to both Congress and state courts. Precisely because the realists had shown that the common law of tort had to be made, not found, and because the Progressives and New Dealers had demonstrated that the particular choices made by federal judges in common law tort cases were politically controversial, the Court in Erie asked whether federal judges ought to be in the business of fashioning a general federal common law.
The Erie Court's answer to this question can also be seen as influenced by legal realism. If common law decisions penned by state judges represented state policy just as much as statutes written by state legislators, then it made little sense for federal judges to defer to the latter, but not the former. Indeed, Professor Hart later wrote that this argument was Erie's "essential rationale."33 At the same time, Erie illustrated how legal process theory might help blunt the legal realist charge of result-oriented jurisprudence. By focusing on second-order rules of power allocation, Justice Brandeis could write a "principled" decision in Erie whose immediate result denial of recovery to a sympathetic plaintiff against a Goliath railroad probably ran counter to the Justice's general inclination against big business. Of course, over the general run of cases, Justice Brandeis may well have believed that the second-order rule announced in Erie might incline federal courts to treat big business more strictly, for those courts would be bound by the predictably more populist decisions of state judges less sympathetic to corporate America.34 Legal process rules were not always "neutral" in an outcome-indifferent sense process, of course, has a substance of its own35-but faithful adherence to these rules did hold out the promise of restraining ad hoc judicial decisionmaking. This theme of "principled" decisionmaking transcending the immediate outcome of the case at bar would, of course, pervade later writings of Professors Hart and Wechsler.36 33 Hart, supra note 27, at 512; see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."). 34 Cf. H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 179, I90 (2d ed. I987) (suggesting that state judges, being less insulated from the political process, tended to be less favorable to corporate concerns than did federal judges in the early twentieth century). 35 
C. Problems37
A case as rich as Erie can be read in many ways; it is thus important to see how the main thrust of legal process thinking over the next generation invoked Erie as a case about federal judicial restraint in relation to state courts, Congress, and parties to lawsuits. The legal process school's image of federal courts was an exceedingly modest one, portraying the article III judiciary as fungible with state courts, wholly dependent on Congress for its subject matter jurisdiction, and incapable of doing more than passively resolving traditional disputes framed by private parties. Yet this reading of Erie was not ineluctable. Indeed, from another perspective, Erie can be seen as inviting a much broader vision of federalism, separation of powers, and "cases and controversies-a vision emphasizing the right and responsibility of federal judges to act as unique and active expositers of federal law. Yet this view masks vital differences between state and federal courtsdifferences that any satisfactory legal process theory must take into account. As Professor Hazard notes:
Trying to assimilate the federal courts to state courts is in any case impossible and therefore quixotic, even if we look at it in terms of "legal rules," as [justice Frankfurter's opinion in] Guaranty put the question. If we look at the legal rules as a whole, and not simply those to be seen through an inverted telescope, we find that:
Federal judges have life tenure, while most state judges do not, a condition that is the product of legal rules. . . .an entire institutional matrix that is the creature of legal rules.44 I have argued elsewhere that the structural superiority of federal courts in federal question cases is strongly supported by the text, history, and structure of article III.45 But even more, it is also supported by Erie itselfalthough admittedly a different reading of Erie than that which prevailed through "the golden age." This reading emphasizes Erie's implications for federal judicial responsibility rather than federal judicial restraint: if Erie says that state courts are the unique and definitive expounders of state law, why isn't the most plausible corollary that federal courts are the unique and definitive expounders of federal law?46 This modest image of the federal judiciary does have some support in Erie. As Professor Mishkin has argued, Congress probably could have legislated the tort law rule of decision implicated by the facts of Erie under its general power to regulate railroads engaged in traffic affecting interstate commerce.47 Erie therefore implies that the power of Congress to displace state tort law does not suggest that federal courts enjoy a corresponding power absent congressional authorization. To support this reading of Erie, Professor Mishkin appealed to Professor Wechsler's analysis of "the political safeguards of federalism,"48 which emphasized the ways in which the political branches of the federal government are constitutionally structured to be attentive to states' rights and interests.49 Unsurprisingly, Professor Wechsler used this set of structural linkages to argue for judicial restraint: federal courts should hesitate to invalidate congressional statutes in the name of states' rights, because those rights are well protected by the internal structure of the political branches.50
Once again, however, it is possible to offer a different reading of Erie and the constitutional structurea reading stressing not federal judicial restraint, but rather federal judicial responsibility to enforce constitutional norms. Justice Brandeis' opinion for the Court in Erie declared that Congress was "without power to enact as statutes" rules of decision for all diversity cases in federal courts.51 Although Professor Mishkin is correct in implying that this statement was not necessary to decide Erie on its facts, Judge Friendly was equally correct in insisting that this language was part of the ratio decidendi By focusing judicial attention on the nature of the right being enforced, Erie caused the principle of a specialized federal common law, binding on all courts because of its source, to develop within a quarter century into a powerful unifying force.. .
A psychiatrist might say that, having rid itself of subconscious feelings of guilt for federal poaching on state preserves, the Supreme Court became freer to insist on deference to federal decisions by the states where deference was due. Thus, the Erie Court held, inter alia, that the diversity and necessary and proper clauses, standing alone, would not authorize Congress to pass a statute displacing all substantive state law in diversity cases.53 Presumably, such congressional legislation would violate states' rights guaranteed by the tenth amendment. So read, Erie stands as a precedent in tension with, rather than supportive of, Professor Wechsler's plea for federal judicial restraint in enforcing federalism-based constitutional limits against Congress. When carefully examined, Erie's particular line of argument thus offers a surprisingly vivid image of the federal judiciary as a guardian of rights against, and not a servant of, Congress.
This image becomes all the more clear when one turns from Erie to the Constitution itself. Far from giving Congress plenary discretion to decide whether state or federal courts are to have the last word on the meaning of federal rights, the Constitution declares that "the judicial power of the United States shall [that is, 'must'] be vested" in the article III judiciary, and "shall [again, 'must'] extend to all cases arising under" federal law.54 This language suggests that federal judicial power is equal and coordinate, not subordinate, to Congress' federal legislative powers. Jurisdiction is vested by the Constitution itself, and congressional power to modify that jurisdiction is plainly bounded by the mandatory language of "shall" and "all." Nor do Professor Wechsler's observations about the constitutional structure of Congress give us good reason to ignore these clear textual mandates against Congress.55 At most, "the political safeguards of federalism" justify judicial restraint when alleged states' rights are at stake; the "safeguards" do not argue for restraint when other claims of constitutional rightfor example, individual rights protected under various clauses in the first eight amendments -are implicated. open, at least on appeal, to resolve any given federal question case finally are controversial ones. For an attempt to defend these claims in much greater detail than is possible here, see Amar, cited above in note 42. 56 Professor Wechsler is well aware of this. See Wechsler, supra note 28, at 56o n.sg. But see infra note 96. BOOK REVIEW 70I doctrine. 64 At first, these defenses might seem inconsistent with the Hart-Wechsler view in the jurisdiction-stripping context that federal courts do not occupy an irreplaceable role as guardians of federal constitutional rights. Yet the two positions are reconcilable by emphasizing the distinctions between action and inaction, and between malfeasance and nonfeasance. Even if Congress need not confer federal jurisdiction over a given constitutional case at all, once a federal court is seized of jurisdiction it can only decide the case according to law. Federal courts therefore must be free to disregard even a congressional statute if they deem that statute inconsistent with the higher legal commands of the Constitution.65 According to the editors, it was betterand permissible, if Congress so desiredfor federal courts to say nothing at all than for them to say something lawless or unprincipled. This was a theme to which Professor Wechsler returned in his famous Holmes Lecture on "Neutral Principles,"66 published in the November I959 Harvard Law Review, and one that Professor Hart underscored in his own Foreword in the same issue, in which he argued that the Supreme Court should decide far fewer cases each term and spend more time hammering out a principled opinion in each case.67 Indeed, Hart would later dramatize his personal commitment to the maxim "if you can't say something principled, then don't say anything-at all" with a poignant finale to his own Holmes Lectures, delivered in I963. In the middle of the period allotted for his final lecture, he confessed to the audience his inability to find a principled and satisfactory solution to the problem he had posed for himself. And then he sat down.68
Thus, both Hart and Wechsler synthesized a defense of Congress against federal courts in the jurisdiction-stripping debate with an even stronger defense of federal courts against Congress in the debate over judicial review. The key to this synthesis lay in their emphasis on the notion of "case or controversy"; judicial review was presented as simply the incidental by-product of deciding properly framed private law disputes that Congress chose to assign to the federal courts. It is thus not surprising that Hart and Wechsler devoted the first doctrinal chapter of their casebook to an elaboration of myriad subdoctrines of 64 See Hart, supra note I9 (responding to Crosskey); Wechsler, supra note 36, at 2-1O (responding to Hand). 65 See Hart, supra note I5, at 1372, 1378-79, I402; Hart, supra note I9, at I457; Wechsler, supra note 36, at 6. 66 See Wechsler, supra note 36. 67 See Hart, supra note 36. 68 For dramatic recountings of this event, see P. BOBBITT, cited above in note ii, at 55-5 7, and Bok, Professor Henry Melvin Hart, Jr., 82 HARV. L. REV. 159 I, I592 (I 969). Professor Hart's Holmes Lectures were never published.
[Vol. 102:688 "cases and controversies" -finality, ripeness, mootness, standing, justiciability, and so forth -or that it is in this chapter that Marbury v. Madison69 appears.
Once again, Erie can be marshalled in support of this vision of the federal judicial function; the Court's constitutional discussion occurred in the context of deciding a classic private law dispute. Yet here too, Erie can be read in a rather different way that emphasizes the responsibility of federal courts to declare federal norms rather than merely to resolve disputes. To begin with, the Court need not have heard the case at all, but chose to through the discretionary writ of certiorari. There is an important difference between a Supreme Court decision invalidating an act of Congress when the Court has no other choicebecause it is legally obliged to hear a given caseand an otherwise similar invalidation that occurs because the Court has exercised its discretion to reach out and opine on an issue. Such discretion enables the Court to act affirmatively, rather than wait passively, to decide on which areas of law to expound. Even more significantly, the Erie Court overruled a century-old line of cases and decided major questions of constitutional law despite the fact that those questions were not briefed by either party and were not even presented in the railroad's certiorari petition.70 In essence, the Court reached out to expound public norms in a manner that went far beyond the way in which the parties had framed their dispute. Together, these facts suggest an image of Supreme Court judicial review as more than merely the unavoidable side effect of deciding private law disputes.
D. Alternatives
But surely to say all thisto suggest an image of the federal courts as structurally superior to state courts on matters of federal law, as equal and coordinate to Congress, and as active expounders of public norms rather than passive resolvers of disputesis to play Hamlet without the Prince. For during "the golden age" of the legal process school, the Supreme Court decided a case that embodied this vision far more than Erie itself; a case that would in fact supplant Erie as the dominant case shaping the outlook and agenda of the next her desk in an all-white classroom, simply raising the equal protection clause as a defense in a subsequent trespass action. Rather, it involved multiple class actions seeking "affirmative" injunctive relief relief that would not simply restore the status quo ante, but would lead to a new status quo that had never before existed, namely, integrated public schools. Brown influenced not simply the form of adjudication, but its very meaning. Indeed, within only a few years the need to implement Brown led the Court in Cooper v. Aaron77 to give voice to the broadest conception of Supreme Court judicial review it had ever articulated, a conception that saw Supreme Court review as the very embodiment of the Constitution's meaning rather than a means of resolving private disputes.78
In retrospect, the paucity of discussion in the "golden age" law reviews cited above of the segregation cases then pending is perhaps even more arresting than the breadth and depth of legal process scholarship in those volumes. 
Like Erie, Carolene Products can be assimilated into the legal process tradition: like the first edition of Hart & Wechsler, footnote four sought to say "what [federal]
courts are good for" and the rest of the opinion sought to say what they were "not good for" (ist ed. p. xii). Indeed, it is probably not coincidental that the two most prominent works of Dean Ely, perhaps the leading process theorist of the generation following Hart and Wechsler, are elaborations of Erie and Carolene Products, respectively.97 -Footnote four, however, conjures up a rather different image of federal courts than that suggested by much of the "golden age" scholarship. According to this vision, the role of federal courts is not simplyin Paul Freund's wordsto "umpir[e] the federal system,"98 but is also to protect individuals against government. However subtly, Freund's phrase suggests that the role of the federal courts is merely to draw boundaries between Congress and the states and among the separate states in order to prevent excessive nationalism or parochialism. By contrast, the vision of footnote four more properly suggests (i) that there are certain powers that neither Congress nor the states should have -such as the power to pass a bill of attainder;99 (2) that federal courts have a unique structural role to play in protecting individuals against government;"00 and (3) that state governments pose dangers not simply to the interests of other states and their citizens, as single-minded focus on diversity cases after Erie might suggest, but also to the constitutional rights of their own citizens.101 Virtually all of the cases cited in footnote four involve constitutional rights against one's own state. The fact that, in many cases, the individual possesses a virtually identical right against Congress undercuts any notion that Congress itself can be trusted to protect those rights adequately if allowed plenary control over federal jurisdiction. When one looks beyond the case law to the Constitution itself, the Carolene Products-Brown102 vision is only strengthened. The Reconstruction amendments were hardly premised on any myth of parity between federal and state courts in protecting individual rights against the states. Nor were federal courts enforcing these amendments seen as simply servants of Congress; indeed, one of the most important consequences of dividing early unitary draft language of the fourteenth amendment into a self-executing section one and a congressionally empowering section five was to allow federal courts to police state compliance even in the absence of congressional support. 103 But the Carolene Products-Brown vision has even deeper roots than the Reconstruction. One of the Federalists' most important goals in the I780's was to forge a strong set of rights that individuals could assert against abuses by their own state governments, as dramatized by article I, section iothe Federalist forbear of the fourteenth amendment. 104 Federal courts were to have a unique role in enforcing those rights. 105 Indeed, the Philadelphia convention deliberately voted to commit ultimate enforcement of these rights against states to federal courts and not to Congress.106 The editors of the first edition failed to grasp the full implications of all this. For example, in their opening chapter, they quoted from a I787 letter by James Madison:
See J. ELY, supra note 35 (elaborating on Carolene Products); Ely, supra note 31 (elaborating on Erie). It is probably coincidental that Dean Ely was born in the same year as the cases he so carefully elaborated -I938. See ASS'N OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 29, at 3I6. It is not surprising, however, that, compared to "golden age" scholarship, Dean Ely's legal process vision was far more influenced by Brown and the general jurisprudence of the Court under Chief Justice Warrenfor whom Ely clerked and to whom he dedicated his book. Cf. Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 223-25 (V. Blasi ed. I983) (discussing differences in outlook between those constitutional scholars born before the New Deal and those born after
The mutability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform, therefore, which does not make some provision for private right must be materially defective. Yet they immediately follow this quotation with language that borders on non sequitur in suggesting that Madison did err: "But the sheer weakness of the Confederation was the most urgent reason for change .. ." (ist ed. p. ii n. 9). 108 And the remainder of the passage reflects an image of federal courts as merely umpires of the federal system and servants of Congress.
To end my discussion of the first edition with a far more dramatic  and significant example, the original editors seriously distorted (C.C.R.I. i8i8) (No. 17,547) , "indicates that [Story] did not consider the constitutional imperative to be self-executing") with Amar, supra note 42, at 257 n.i68 (arguing that White indicates only that Story did not believe that lower federal court jurisdiction was self-executing). 118 G. WOOD, supra note io8.
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The casebook's initial response to these events was disappointing for twenty years there was silence;127 then, in I973 (exactly thirtyfive years after Erie) there appeared a second edition of the casebook, which in retrospect seems like a last-ditch effort to prop up the increasingly problematic vision of the first edition. To be sure, new cases and scholarship were mentioned, but their lessons were not fully integrated into the book's analytic structure. Perhaps the editors felt that any major modification of the first edition's substantive vision would be faithless to the genius of the originalthat anything else would not be Hart & Wechsler. But if such a concern lay behind the second edition, it was misguided. The real genius of the first edition its enduring contribution to American lawlay not in its particular substantive vision, but in its legal process methodology. Its purest nuggets were the basic questions it asked, and not the particular answers it implied. The challenge facing the editors of the third edition, then, was to preserve the insights and power of legal process analysis -"to retain the historical and analytic richness" (p. xxi) of the original editorswhile modifying some of the specific substantive positions endorsed or implied by the earlier editions.
II. THE PRESENT
Judged by this standard, the third edition gets high marks. 128 Indeed, so much is improved that, to echo words written thirty-five years ago about the first edition, "[a] modest reviewer is required to apologize, whatever else he says, for not praising all its fine points; they are too many to be listed. It is simply an extraordinary book: in range, in scholarship, in penetration."1129 Some of the improvements are evident simply from side-by-side comparison of the tables of contents. Whereas the first edition treated both federal question and diversity jurisdiction in a single chapter, the third edition expands the material on the former and relegates the latter to a much later chapterchanges to be cheered by those followers of Justice Story who believe that the two categories of jurisdiction are fundamentally different as a matter not simply of policy, but of constitutional law. 130 Another fine innovation is a new chapter integrating various doctrinal issues related to suits against state and federal governments and their officials (pp. I080-307).
Building on the premises of Marbury 127 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 128 The second edition scores lower on this scale. In virtually every area discussed below, the major improvements took place between the second and third editions and not between the first and second. 129 v. Madisonl3l itself a suit seeking affirmative relief against a federal official despite the absence of an obvious violation of common law rights -the Supreme Court in this century has read the Constitution as creating self-executing rights of action against government officials for both injunctive relief132 and damages.133 In I954, Henry Hart expressed doubt about such developments because they seemed to leapfrog what he saw as the traditional eighteenth-and nineteenthcentury requirement that even unconstitutional government action must infringe upon a common law or statutory right before a wellframed case or controversy could be made out.134 Similarly, as has already been mentioned, Hart questioned whether affirmative relief against state governments was consistent with the eleventh amendment.135 By contrast, Professors Shapiro and Meltzer, two of the editors of the third edition, have been rather critical of several of the assumptions underlying Hart's analysisassumptions about the structure of federalism, the meaning of the eleventh amendment, the essential nature of "cases and controversies," and the need for strict distinctions between "affirmative" and "negative" remedies.136 Perhaps because of the healthy dialectical tension between the views of an original editor and those of later ones, the new chapter succeeds in presenting a balanced and thoughtful analysis of the many issues implicated in this rapidly changing subfield.137 admittedly stylized, conceptions of "cases and controversies"the  traditional "dispute resolution" model and an emerging "public action"  model (pp. 79-82). From the very outset, the reader is alerted to a  way of thinking about federal jurisdiction that goes beyond the assumptions of the editors of the first edition; indeed, the new editors  explicitly invoke the "[s]chool desegregation cases" (p. 8o) and invite the reader to ask herself throughout the chapter "whether a significant change in overall conception is occurring and, if so, whether such a change is warranted" (p. 82).138 Several pages later, the new editors follow this invitation with a sensitive and sophisticated analysis of "the breakdown of the common-law model" (p. 12 I), "[t]he emergence of a new conception of constitutional rights" (p. 122), and various ways of conceptualizing the notion of "standing" (pp. 12I-23).
Even more dramatic may be the way the third edition revises the original editors' analysis of Congress' power to restrict federal jurisdiction. The analytic notes now begin with a section recaptioned "The Position of Justice Story," which presents a far more careful summary and analysis of his various lines of argument (pp. 366-68). A later section entitled "The Current Debate" (pp. 379-87) carefully disentangles issues that the first edition had tended to conflate. For example, the original editors had opened their chapter with a back-to-back presentation of Sheldon v. Sill'39 and Ex parte McCardle.140 This ordering of the cases might easily be read to imply that because, as Sheldon held, Congress has broad power to restrict lower federal court jurisdiction and, as McCardle held, it also has broad power to restrict the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, it must necessarily follow that Congress can do both at the same time and thus leave many Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. II28 (I986) (arguing that, where the underlying substantive law is federal, rules of waiver in state court should be governed by federal common law) with Hart, supra note 27, at 508 ("The general rule, bottomed deeply in belief in the importance of state control of state judicial procedure, is that federal law takes the state courts as it finds them.") and Hart, supra note 36 (making a similar argument) and Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1054 (1977) ("The problem of federal-state relations is the same, moreover, whether the antecedent state law issue is substantive or procedural. It is difficult to understand, therefore, why there should be a difference in the nature or the scope of the Supreme Court's examination of the state determinations."). 138 A change in overall conception may well be occurring in the minds of the casebook editors, but it must be emphasized that "the public action" model is no upstart, as even the current edition at times might seem to imply. In Marbury itself, the "public action" model is intertwined with the "dispute resolution" model. See supra note 69. 139 unitary one" (p. 379) . The pages that follow this reminder are exemplarynot only of the high standard of scholarship and fairness that informs the entire book, but also in an even deeper sense: they establish by example what good legal scholarship is and can be. Cases, commentary, and historical material are elegantly and succinctly sumrmarized, synthesized, and analyzed. Although the editors do not shrink from posing hard questions about each of the current competing theories about jurisdiction-stripping (including, it must be said in the interest of full disclosure, the theory that this reviewer has propounded (pp. 385-87)), they never distort those theories. It is not easy to be both gracious and incisive, but the editors here pull off this combination with remarkable skill. As a result, the reader's attention is focused both on the strongest lines of argument that have thus far emerged and on those areas where much more hard thinking and research need to be done.
III. THE FUTURE
It bears repeating that there is far more superb material both old and newin the third edition than any single Review could hope to describe and engage. The preceding remarks have focused particular attention on jurisdiction-stripping issues for two main reasons. First, this is an area in which I have a personal scholarly interest. But there is a second, deeper, and less personal reason for emphasizing jurisdiction-stripping. The issues it raises go to the very essence of one's conception of "the federal courts and the federal system." Federalism, separation of powers, "cases and controversies " all are powerfully implicated in, and illuminated by, one's position in the jurisdiction-stripping debate. The original editors were keenly aware of the centrality of the issues raised by the Dialogue. In the words of their preface:
An understanding of the constitutional powers of Congress simply to distribute jurisdiction between state and federal courts . . . is an essential foundation for consideration, throughout the remainder of i989] BOOK REVIEW 7I5 the course, of the issues of legislative and interpretive policy which the existence of these powers must continually pose (ist ed. p. xiii).
Although subsequent scholars of federal jursidiction have not always shared the Dialogue's particular views about the scope of Congress' constitutional power "simply to distribute jurisdiction between state and federal courts," these scholars have in the main agreed with Hart and Wechsler about the overarching importance of the issue. Hence the tremendous outpouring of scholarship on the topic since I953 and the extraordinary attention paid to the Dialogue itself.
These observations suggest possible lines of development that might be usefully considered for subsequent editions of, or supplements to, the casebook.142 One impoLtant set of issues now touched on by the third edition's section on jurisdiction-stripping concerns the parity, or lack thereof, of state and federal courts: are these courts fungible as a matter of either sociology or constitutional law? The first edition's discussion of jurisdiction-stripping did not even raise the question; parity was simply, and to my mind erroneously, assumed. 143 The third edition is better on this count (pp. 384 & n.34, 386 & n.39), but even it fails to develop the issue with the degree of care and precision that are the hallmarks of the book. This failing is all the more significant becauseas with so many aspects of the jurisdictionstripping debatethe question of parity between state and federal courts has implications for a vast set of other doctrinal issues: abstention, the eleventh amendment, res judicata, collateral review, the socalled Rooker-Feldman doctrine,144 certiorari, and habeas corpus, to name just a few. 145 Yet I cannot recall anything more than a passing reference, if that, to parity in any of these other contexts; indeed, I cannot recall even a single citation outside the jurisdiction-stripping discussion to Professor Neuborne's classic article on The Myth of Parity. 146 142 To be sure, the revisions made for the third edition reflect Herculean labors of many persons over many years. By raising the issue of still more revisions, I do not mean to deny the editors a well-deserved rest, but it does not seem too early to begin to think about the next round of editing. 143 This assumption is built into the Dialogue's repeated and unselfconscious use of the word "court" -a word that obscures the obvious structural, textual, and historical differences between state judges and article III judges. See Amar, supra note 42, at 238 n.115. 144 I must confess a certain degree of surprise at the current editors' description of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 4I3 (1923), as a "classic" (p. xxi). 145 For a fine analysis of how the parity issue plays out in many of these contexts, see Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. II4 (I988). 146 Neuborne, supra note 73. In the jurisdiction-stripping discussion, I can recall only a singleand uncharacteristically cryptic and unilluminatingreference to Professor Neuborne's essay (p. 384 n.34). My hedging on these points leads me to make another suggestion that is perhaps substantively trivial, but that would, I think, significantly improve the handiness of the book as a reference tool and teaching manual: future editions should include a table of authorities in addition to a table of cases. This failure to address parity as a central theme of the third edition is all the more surprising when one looks at the other scholarship of the current editors. Their work has focused considerably more on the parity issue than did the scholarship of the original editors. In sum, the importance of the parity issue, and the existence of two competing schools of thought on it, suggest that future editors should, at the very least, flag the parity question with greater care at the outset of the book, and invite the reader to keep it in mind throughoutmuch as the current editors have alerted the reader at the outset to the existence of two competing schools of thought about "cases and controversies."
A second issue that could usefully be identified at the outset is whether the menu of "cases and controversies" listed in article III is unitary or two-tiered: should we treat "cases and controversies" as an undifferentiated unitas Chapter Two implicitly does in its very titleor is it more useful and illuminating to follow the precise language of article III by distinguishing between, on the one hand, federal question, admiralty, and ambassador cases, which are all defined by subject matter, and, on the other, diversity-type controversies, which are all defined by party status?
Once again, this is an issue that is centrally implicated in the jurisdiction-stripping debate,150 although the first edition skirted the 147 REV. 193. 149 Other editors of the third edition have also discussed the parity issue. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note I37, at II36 n.28 (citing Neuborne and suggesting that there is "significant evidence that federal courts are generally, though by no means uniformly, more protective than state courts of particular federal rights"). 150 See Amar, supra note 42, at 240-54; supra pp. 709-I0.
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BOOK REVIEW 7I7 question through selective quotation of Justice Story's views. And once again, the third edition is much better on this score (pp. 367-68, 385-86) -but perhaps still more could be usefully done, given the considerable number of other doctrinal contexts in which the issue arises. For example: should ancillary and pendent party jurisdiction be more liberal when a federal court is exercising jurisdiction over a federal question case rather than a diversity controversy? Should abstention policy vary depending on whether a federal question case or a diversity controversy is before the court? Although the third edition poses these questions (pp. i688, I358), they might be;sharpened by reminding the reader of Justice Story's argument that cases and controversies were qualitatively different as a matter of constitutional law. 151 Indeed, perhaps the very distinction between cases and controversies may shed additional light on the distinction that is prominently featured at the outset of the third edition: namely, the distinction between the "dispute resolution" and "public action" models of adjudication (pp. 79-82).
In an unpublished manuscript, Robert Pushaw argues that there are "functional differences between a 'case'-where a judge's law-declaring role is paramount, and a 'controversy' where a judge's ability as a dispute-resolver is highlighted."'152 This line of analysis may help the reader to see old problems in new ways. Consider Erie v. Tompkins one final time. If the role of federal courts in a diversity controversy is more akin to that of an impartial "arbitrator," "umpire," or "mediator" than to that of a normdeclarer authoritatively expounding "what the law is," then why should federal judges create a "controversy" where none exists? Where, as was true in Erie, state courts of both New York and Pennsylvaniathe home states of the respective partiesagree that Pennsylvania state court tort decisions should govern, why should a federal court arbitrating the dispute not abide by that agreement?153 Where, on the other hand, a federal question case is before a federal court, a more active judicial role may be in order. Thus, the Erie Court went beyond dispute-resolution on the federal constitutional issues it reached out to decide, even while laying down a general rule that federal courts should not act as primary norm-declarers in ordi-151 A debate is currently raging between those who read the eleventh amendment as barring federal court jurisdiction over certain federal question cases, and those who see the amendment as simply repealing federal jurisdiction over a type of diversity controversy, thereby leaving intact plenary federal question jurisdiction (pp. II59-22I).
In contrast to their treatment of pendent party jurisdiction and abstention, the editors here do a very nice job of reminding the reader of the possible relevance of a two-tiered view of article III to this debate (p. II69 I1. i6). 152 nary diversity controversies posing only state law questions. To the extent that Erie was a case it invites a rather expansive role for the federal judiciary; to the extent that it was a controversy, it implies a more limited "arbitration" role. The centrality of norm-declaration in federal question cases invites a rethinking of a host of doctrines often, but perhaps wrongly, catalogued as "jurisdictional": standing,154 ripeness,155 declaratory judgments,156 mootness,157 finality,158 adequate and independent state 154 Attention to the etymological linkages between "case" and "cause" should help to remind us that a properly framed case in which a plaintiff has "standing" is simply one in which she has a cause of action. Yet whether such a cause of action exists cannot be determined by staring at the words of article III; one must look outside that article to substantive constitutional, statutory, and common law norms. Although the current editors suggest as much (pp. I22-23, I73), perhaps they would be truer to this insight by putting the entire discussion of standing in their chapter on federal common law alongside cases like Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (i97i), and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (i964). This would make clear that standing is primarily an issue of substantive law.
Any legitimate interest in guaranteeing adverse presentation of issues can easily be handled through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, a judge could allow liberal participation by amici and appointed counsel. Prudential concerns are better addressed through certiorari policy than through the creation of a doctrine that applies to all federal courts (p. 87 & n.9). 155 Like standing, ripeness obviously turns on one's conception not of article III, but of the substantive interests asserted. A first amendment absolutist like Hugo Black and a balancer like Felix Frankfurter will predictably disagree about whether a given anticipatory challenge to a law allowing prior restraint in certain specified circumstances is ripe because the absolutist deems various facts that have not yet materialized irrelevantprior restraint is always impermissiblewhereas a balancer might find those facts dispositive. But this is a disagreement about the meaning of the first amendment, and not about article III.
Similarly, the ripeness of the Does' claim in Roe v. Wade, 4IO U.S. II3 (1973), depends on whether the fourteenth amendment is read as only protecting a right to procure an abortion without government interference or as also protecting a right to engage in sex without government-created fear. Once again, it is unsatisfactory to treat this, as the Court did, as an article III question. The answer will depend on a careful analysis of the fourteenth amendment, which the Court nowhere even mentioned in its summary ripeness disposition. See id. at I27-29. 156 Why should declaratory judgments be seen as posing a special "problem" (ist ed. p. I26)? Every damage award or permanent injunction implicitly relies on an underlying judicial declaratory judgment of legal rights. Indeed, this is the difference between arbitrators, who can award money, and judges, who say "what the law is." It should be seen as more of a "problem" when judges fail to write opinions justifying their decisions with declarations of law, for the very word jurisdiction is "composed of JUS and DICTO, juris, dictio, or a speaking or pronouncing of the law." THE FEDERALIST NO. 8i, at 489 n.* (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. I96I). Interestingly, the editors omit this section from their reprinting of THE FEDERALIST No. 8i (pp. 26-28), and do not prominently identify norm-declaration in their definition of the "essential aspect of the judicial function" (p. 67). 157 Where past injury has in fact occurred, why is a case ever deemed moot? Even if money damages or injunctive remedies are inappropriate, a declaratory judgment is always possible. (It seems this should also always be a sufficient prospective remedy to satisfy the "redressability" prong of standing (p. I28).) Why are pieces of paper with Presidents' pictures on them more obviously remedial for a past nonmonetary harm than a piece of paper signed by a judge saying that defendant violated plaintiff's rights? Why, then, did the Court imply that the possibility i989] BOOK REVIEW 7I9 grounds,159 and advisory opinions,160 to name a few. This Review is hardly the place to elaborate such rethinking in detail, although I have attempted in the footnotes to hint at possible lines of development in each of the above-mentioned areas. Several of these lines have been thoughtfully pursued in recent years by scholars and further development seems likely.
This brings me to my final point: the long-term future direction of Hart & Wechsler cannot be predicted with perfect precision because that direction will be influenced by the direction of legal scholarship as a whole. Although I have suggested possible paths of doctrinal development, I cannot claim a high degree of certainty in these predictions. I am, however, more confident in making a more general prediction that future editions of Hart & Wechsler will be profoundly influenced by the general character of legal scholarship, which the book has always sought to synthesize. The first edition's weaknesses and omissions were in large part reflective of omissions in "golden age" legal scholarship generally. These omissions, in turn, were in part due to the considerable inbreeding within legal process circles. (Consider, for example, the intricate web of connections among Brandeis, Frankfurter, Hart, Wechsler, Sacks, Freund, Kurland, Hill, and Mishkin.)161 If the third edition is better in many respects, it is of a back pay award might be necessary to avoid mootness in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-500 (i969)? Even if one insists on thinking in crass economic terms, Adam Clayton Powell would no doubt have been willing to pay for a declaratory judgment in his favor, and the defendants would probably have been willing to pay to avoid such a judgment. Under this view, the only properly moot case is one in which a properly ripe anticipatory challenge is brought, and subsequent events make clear that the challenged conduct is unlikely ever to materialize. The third edition presents just such a hypothetical (p. 8i). Apart from this scenario, mootness is not generally symmetrical to ripeness. In an unripe case, conduct challenged as illegal may never occur; in a moot case, it already has (with the one qualification just noted).
158 What does finality have to do with the proper exercise of judicial power? Lower court opinions have always been subject to review by higher courts, but does their obvious lack of finality render these opinions problematic? And if the real issue is the possibility not of judicial revision, but of legislative or executive revision occasioned by possible refusal to appropriate money or enforce injunctive relief, is not judicial entry of a declaratory judgment itself a final judgment on the law immune from revision by other branches? 159 Even if an independent and adequate state law prevents the Supreme Court from entering a coercive remedy on behalf of a petitioner, why is the Court jurisdictionally precluded from declaring whether the petitioner's federal rights were violated? Of course, even if jurisdictional authority to furnish such a remedy exists, equitable discretion and considerations of resource allocation may generally counsel against exercise of that authority. 160 The prohibition against "advisory opinions" should mean only that federal courts should not give advice about wise policy, but should confine themselves to legal judgments. Properly understood, the advisory opinion doctrine is rather similar to the political question doctrine as defined by Professor Wechsler (pp. 293-94) . Both should rest only on a finding that the Constitution has committed a policy decision to another branch of government; neither should operate to prevent federal courts from saying "what the law is." 161 See supra notes 7-8, i6, 26, 52 & 7I.
[Vol. I02:688 because legal scholarship since I 953 has illuminated some issues obscured during the "golden age." The story of The Federal Courts and the Federal System has thus been inextricably intertwined with the story of American legal scholarship as a whole. And that story, in turn, has been in part the story of intergenerational tensionthe story of the great difficulty with which one generation is able to see the world as it will appear to the next. 162 What can you say with certainty about what the next chapter of this law story will hold?'63
